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ABSTRACT
Online video chat services such as Chatroulette, Omegle,
and vChatter that randomly match pairs of users in video
chat sessions are fast becoming very popular, with over a
million users per month in the case of Chatroulette. A key
problem encountered in such systems is the presence of flash-
ers and obscene content. This problem is especially acute
given the presence of underage minors in such systems. This
paper presents SafeVchat, a novel solution to the problem
of flasher detection that employs an array of image detec-
tion algorithms. A key contribution of the paper concerns
how the results of the individual detectors are fused together
into an overall decision classifying the user as misbehaving
or not, based on Dempster-Shafer Theory. The paper in-
troduces a novel, motion-based skin detection method that
achieves significantly higher recall and better precision. The
proposed methods have been evaluated over real-world data
and image traces obtained from Chatroulette.com.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online video chat services have become increasingly popu-
lar, and include such systems as Chatroulette [9], BlurryPeo-
ple [5], RandomDorm [34], Omegle [31], vChatter [24], etc.
While most of these services have been introduced only re-
cently (less than one year ago), statistics show that member-
ship in for example Chatroulette has grown by 500% since
the beginning of 2010. Furthermore, tens of thousands of
users are online in Chatroulette at any point of time, 24
hours a day. In July 2010, 1.3 million US users [22] and
6.3 million users in total [39] are estimated to have visited
Chatroulette.
A common feature of such online video chat services is that
they randomly match pairs of users via video connections.
In the most popular cases, users are anonymous from each
other, and need not supply any overt information to the
system or other users that may identify them, such as their
name or profile. Users of such systems can quickly move on
to the next random pairing by clicking “Next”. In addition,
such services are typically offered for free, and are easy to
use, which enhances their popularity.
A key problem encountered in such anonymous video chat
systems is that many of the users may engage in sexually
explicit behavior such as flashing/revealing themselves with
full frontal nudity. This misbehavior drives away other users
that are not interested in viewing such obscene content, thus
limiting such systems from achieving their full popularity. In
addition, flasher-type misbehavior has potential legal rami-
fications since many of the viewers attracted to such video
chat systems are minors [14]. Our observations on a typical
Saturday night indicate that as many as 20-30% of Cha-
troulette users are minors. Even though users must confirm
that they are at least 16 years old and agree not to broadcast
obscene, offending or pornographic material, it is nearly im-
possible to enforce this due to the lack of login or registration
requirements of such anonymous systems.
One approach to deal with misbehavior is to de-anonymize
users, on the hypothesis that requiring users to reveal their
identities will then force users to behave. For example,
vchatter uses such an approach on Facebook, where only
Facebook users may participate in its Facebook applica-
tion, and the Facebook name of users in the video chat
are displayed during each video pairing session. This ap-
proach of using de-anonymization to address misbehaving
users has several drawbacks. First, it undercuts one of the
primary motivations that attracts users to the most popular
roulette-type video services, namely that people can partici-
pate anonymously for fun. Second, flashers can circumvent
this approach by registering false/dummy profiles.
An alternative approach to dealing with misbehavior is
to analyze the video sessions to detect obscene content, and
thus flag misbehaving users. Some video chat sites have
taken manual crowd-sourcing to detect misbehaving users,
i.e. images/screen captures are sent to real humans who are
paid to manually identify whether the user is a flasher or
not [9]. Such approaches incur a high economic cost and
thus are not scalable. Moreover, such approaches are not
necessarily applied uniformly, i.e. only images that are ”re-
ported” (Chatroulette for example has a ”Report” button to
flag misbehaving users) are actually inspected. Our analysis
indicates that not all misbehaving users are reported, and
some users who are not misbehaving are still reported as
such by pranksters.
A more promising and scalable approach is automated
detection of misbehaving users, by employing image recog-
nition algorithms. In particular, we investigate a novel solu-
tion to the problem of flasher detection that fuses together
an array of evidences that image recognition algorithms re-
fine. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
investigating this problem space. This paper claims the fol-
lowing key contributions:
• we identify and analyze the issues introduced by on-
line video chat systems, present statistical studies of
its users, and demonstrate that existing pornography
detection algorithms don’t work well in this problem
space.
• we describe a holistic solution to detect flashers and
obscene content that (1) adapts this problem space to
a set of evidence that image recognition algorithms re-
fine, including evidence of a face, eyes and nose, etc.,
(2) introduce our own novel motion-based skin detec-
tor to supplement classification of misbehaving users,
and (3) we fuse these individual evidences by building
a probabilistic model using Dempster-Shafer Theory
(DST) [36] to obtain a joint classification of each user
as misbehaving or not.
• we evaluate the effectiveness of our fused classifier sys-
tem in terms of its precision and recall by employing
real world data sets obtained from Chatroulette.com.
The research reported in this work is in close collabora-
tion with Chatroulette. We thank Andrey Ternovskiy, the
founder of Chatroulette.com, for providing us with these
otherwise unobtainable internal data traces. The observa-
tions, algorithm design and system evaluations are carried
out based on the dataset. It is worth noting that though we
use the Chatroulette system as a running example in this pa-
per, our approach is generally applicable to all roulette-type
video chat services.
In the following, we describe related work, present a statis-
tical analysis of users using the Chatroulette dataset, explain
the limitations of existing techniques, and glean key observa-
tions from the user data. We then describe the architecture
of our fused classifier system - SafeVChat, including the de-
sign requirements, and individual system components. Next,
we describe our motion-based skin detection algorithm. We
then detail the probabilistic model used to fuse together
the results of the individual classifiers leveraging Dempster-
Shafer Theory. Finally, we provide a rigorous evaluation of
the effectiveness of our joint classification system using the
data traces obtained from within Chatroulette.com.
2. RELATEDWORK
Content-based image analysis has been an active research
area for over a decade (see [12, 28] for some surveys). In par-
ticular, skin-color modeling and skin detection techniques
have been successfully used for detecting pornographic con-
tent with high accuracy in Internet videos [25, 19, 27, 7,
6, 41, 35, 23, 21]. However, skin appearance may vary
significantly for different illumination, background, camera
characteristics, and ethnicity, which are particularly true in
online video chat images. A recent survey study [26] con-
cludes that skin detection methods may only be used as a
preprocessor for obscene content detection, and other con-
tent types such as text [19] and motion analysis [21] may
be incorporated to improve accuracy. In this paper, we
propose a novel, motion-based skin detection method that
analyzes several consecutive video frames. This method
achieves much higher recall and better precision than PicBlock [32],
a widely-used pornographic image blocker.
Besides skin detection, our work also leverages an array
of image recognition techniques, including face, nose, eye,
mouth, and upper body detectors, which are supported in
the latest version of OpenCV library [20]. An extensive sur-
vey of these techniques is outside the scope of this paper.
We focus on adapting these techniques to our online video
chat images and identifying the strengths and limitations of
each individual technique. Such information is then utilized
in the fusion process.
A number of (ensemble) methods have been proposed to
combine or fuse multiple classifiers in order to reach a fi-
nal classification decision. Two representative methods are
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [36] and AdaBoost [15]. Com-
pared to AdaBoost, DST supports multi-level decisions, and
further considers the reliability of the evidence provided by
Figure 1: Categorization and percentage of different
types of users in the Chatroulette dataset.
each classifier. DST has been applied in a variety of classifi-
cation settings, such as [29, 3, 10, 30]. The key challenge of
using DST is to define the appropriate mass function (or ba-
sic probability) assignment, which is dependent on specific
applications. One of the main contributions of this work is
how we design mass function and apply DST to detecting
obscene content in online video chat services.
3. DATA ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS
In this section, we analyze a real-world dataset obtained
from Chatroulette. After an initial statistical analysis of this
dataset, we then investigate a state-of-the-art commercial
software for pornography detection. We identify the lim-
itations of this technique and present the key observations
derived from our dataset with regard to obscene content and
misbehaving users.
3.1 Dataset and Statistics
We have obtained a real-life dataset, provided by the founder
of Chatroulette Andrey Ternovskiy, containing screenshot
images from 20,000 users. Each screenshot image has a 320
× 240 resolution. Based on our analysis of this dataset,
we categorized these 20,000 users into two types: offensive
and normal users. Offensive or misbehaving users are de-
fined based on the following criteria. If a user broadcasts
obscene content or behaviors (offensive content), or inten-
tionally shows his/her naked chest without face in front
of the webcam (potential offensive content), or broadcasts
pornographic advertisements (advertisement content), then
the user is defined as an offensive user. On the contrary, nor-
mal users are chatters who stay fully clothed. A majority of
normal users show their faces in front of webcams (we call
the content that these users broadcast as normal content)
and some others point their webcams to their clothed chest
(we call the content that these users broadcast as potential
normal content). In addition to these two types of content,
there is a special type of normal users who completely block
their webcams, or point their webcams to a static scene (e.g.
a room corner or ceiling), or broadcast pre-prepared inter-
esting videos etc. (we call the content that these normal
users broadcast as other content). Figure 1 (original dataset)
shows the categorization and distribution of different types
of users and content in the Chatroulette dataset. Since Cha-
troulette took screenshots for all the users at approximately
the same time and randomly selected 20,000 users as well as
their screenshot images, we believe the Chatroulette dataset
is representative of Chatroulette users’ characteristics.
3.2 Limitations of Exisitng Techniques
Existing techniques for detecting objectionable content
are mostly content-based, which typically utilize both image
recognition and text analysis techniques to filter out porno-
graphic webpages. Different from detecting pornographic
webpages, detecting objectionable content in the context of
online video chat systems cannot rely on text message anal-
ysis, since the content communicated between chatters does
not pass through the central server and obtaining text mes-
sages that were exchanged is not practical. Furthermore,
some chatters may have a conversation using audio devices
instead of typing messages. Consequently, we focus on in-
vestigating whether state-of-the-art image recognition tech-
niques, which are used for pornographic website detection,
can be applied to objectionable content detection in the con-
text of online video chat systems.
Specifically, we used PicBlock 4.2.3 (Pornographic Im-
age Blocker), a state-of-the-art commercial software [32],
to classify 1,000 user screenshot images which were ran-
domly selected from the Chatroulette dataset. Surprisingly,
even though PicBlock usually achieves high accuracy when
detecting pornographic images on websites, it performed
poorly on the screenshot images of online video chat users
– the precision and recall for correctly detecting misbehav-
ing users were only 0.253 and 0.390, respectively. This is
mainly due to the large diversity in illumination, sensing
quality of web cameras used by different chatters, ethnicity
(African, Asian, Caucasian and Hispanic groups), and varia-
tions in individual user characteristics such as age, sex, what
is prominently displayed in the image, and so on. Other
factors such as appearances (makeup, hairstyle and glasses
etc.), backlighting, shadows and motion also have significant
influence on skin-color appearance. Indeed, these issues have
also been investigated in a recent survey study [26], which
concluded that the skin detection methodology can only be
used as a preprocessor for obscene content detection.
3.3 Key Observations
Using the Chatroulette dataset, we have conducted fur-
ther analysis and identified some discriminative characteris-
tics that are specific in online video chat services. (1) Misbe-
having users on online video chat systems usually hide their
faces because they are not willing to compromise their iden-
tity privacy. (2) Different from regular pornographic images,
misbehaving users may not completely expose themselves.
For example, some misbehaving users may only expose their
genitals in front of the webcam and stay partially clothed.
(3) Chatters who present their faces in front of webcams are
mostly normal users because showing both the body trunk
and the face of a user requires the user placing his/her we-
bcam far from the user, but chatters who do not show their
faces may not be flashers. (4) A fair amount of chatters do
not show their faces clearly. For example, only a partial face
is presented in front of the webcam. (5) Webcams are usu-
ally set up in a stable way, i.e., a majority of chatters do not
keep moving or adjusting their webcams. In the following
sections, we take advantage of these observations to design
our obscene content detection system.
4. ARCHITECTURE
The primary goal of our system is to detect users who
abuse online video chat services, namely those who display
obscene content. In this section, we first discuss the system
design requirements and assumptions about Chatroulette’s
capabilities in terms of providing our system with data for
analysis purposes. Following that, we describe the architec-
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: A few screenshot images from Chatroulette.
ture of our SafeVchat system.
4.1 Design Requirements
To design our obscene content detection system, there are
several important requirements. First, in terms of correctly
classifying a misbehaving user, the precision should be high
because in a system such as Chatroulette, all users classi-
fied as misbehaving will be subject to further costly review
by crowdsourcing. We therefore want to be precise in only
classifying users as misbehaving who are truly misbehaving,
as any false positives incur an additional economic cost. We
also want our recall to be high, since if we miss a misbehav-
ing user via a false negative, these users will appear in the
chat system. The resulting cost is twofold: adult users will
be put off by the obscene content and may leave the system;
further, minors would be subject to inappropriate content.
In an online video chat system, for system scalability, the
video stream is transmitted in a peer-to-peer manner after
a pair of users have been matched by the server. It is pro-
hibitively expensive to obtain and monitor users’ complete
video content from a centralized server. To detect offensive
content, the Chatroulette server is however able to partially
obtain a user’s video content by periodically taking sequen-
tial screenshot images from the user. The sequential screen-
shot images are taken at a predefined fixed time interval.
Currently, in one period, three screenshot images are taken.
Therefore, our obscene content detection system is designed
based on the assumption that systems like Chatroulette are
capable of providing this capacity.
4.2 System Architecture
Our key approach is to use evidence from multiple clas-
sifiers to strengthen the overall classification of whether a
user is misbehaving or not. We consider the following types
of evidence while designing our detection system, namely
evidence of the presence of face, eyes, nose and mouth, up-
per body evidence and skin exposure evidence. Many of the
individual classifiers that we will use are based on detecting
a human face, since our observations from Section 3 indi-
cate that misbehaving users hide their faces, while chatters
who reveal their faces are typically normal users. However,
a face detector needs to be augmented by additional facial
evidences, since many of the following scenarios may occur
based on our observations:
• In the process of taking a screenshot for a user, the
user’s face might be blocked by the user’s hands. Thus
this face evidence alone is not able to be refined by our
system. (See Figure 2(a)).
• A user may intentionally show his face partially and
our system can only refine partial facial evidences. For
example, Figure 2(b) shows that only eyes are present
in the screenshot image.
• Even though we use the state-of-the-art face detector
to refine face evidence, there is still the possibility that
Figure 3: SafeVchat: System architecture for detec-
ing misbehaving users in online video chat services.
the face cannot be detected (See Figure 2(c)).
Figure 3 shows the architecture of our SafeVchat system.
The system contains five main components including a dark-
ness filter, facial detectors, an upper body detector, a skin
exposure detector and a fusion component. The darkness
filter is used for identifying users who operate their web-
cams in the dark. The remaining users are subject to fused
classification. Facial detectors contain a set of individual
classifiers - face, eye, nose and mouth classifiers. The upper
body detector is used for identifying whether an upper body
is present. The classifiers that our system uses for facial and
upper-body detection are provided by the OpenCV library
and their outputs are all binary values to indicate presence
or absence. The motion-based skin detector is a motion and
skin color based classifier which we designed for determining
the probability that a user is a misbehaving chatter. Finally,
the fusion component of SafeVchat is used for combining ev-
idences from facial detectors, the upper body detector and
the motion-based skin detector to refine and make a final
probabilistic decision. The fusion component is based on
Dempster-Shafer Theory, and will be discussed in detail in
Section 6.
The work flow of our system is as follows: When the three
sequential screenshot images of a user are fed into our de-
tection system from Chatroulette, the darkness detector first
determines whether the user is using his or her webcam in
the dark. If yes, a warning notification will be sent to the
user. Otherwise, these screenshot images will be passed to
the facial detectors, upper body detector and skin exposure
detector. These detectors use their respective classifiers to
refine evidence from the three screenshot images and pass
their refined evidences to the fusion component. The fusion
component harnesses the refined evidences to make a prob-
abilistic decision and output how likely the user is classified
as a misbehaving user.
5. MOTION-BASED SKIN DETECTION
We mentioned earlier that existing color-based skin detec-
tion techniques do not work well for the screenshot images
of online video chat users. Specifically, we tested two ex-
isting methods: the Adaptive real-time skin detector from
OpenCV [11, 20], and PicBlock, a commercial software for
pornography detection. Neither method performed well on
our video chat dataset (see Section 7 for details). This is
mainly due to the diversity of skin color appearance (e.g.,
illumination, webcam characteristics) and skin-color like ob-
jects/backgrounds (e.g., yellowish sofa or white wall with
yellowish lighting). As a result, real user skin may not be
detected, while non-skin objects/backgrounds may be mis-
classified as skin leading to low flasher detection accuracy in
online video chat services.
We also observe that in online video chat sessions, the
moving parts in images are usually the region of interest
– e.g., normal users moving their heads and clothed body
parts, or flashers moving their naked body parts or touch
naked parts with hand. Users with larger “non-face skin” ex-
posure in such“target regions”are more likely to be flashers.
The adaptive skin detector does consider motion in images,
but its skin color palette does not capture the diversity of
skin colors in online video chat images. In addition, it uses
the optical flow method, which assumes only small motion
in video frames. This assumption may not hold in online
video chat services with large number of concurrent users
– capturing high frequency video frames is infeasible and
screenshots can only be captured with larger time intervals
(e.g., 10 seconds in our dataset). Therefore, user movement
between two consecutive screenshots can be significant.
In this work, we propose a novel motion-based skin de-
tection method to detect obscene content and misbehaving
users in online video chat systems. Our method consists
of four major components: (1) calculates the target map
(which contains the target region) via motion in consecu-
tive screenshots; (2) uses a new skin detector with different
skin color palettes to detect “non-face skin” in the target re-
gion; (3) calculates the skin proportion, which is the ratio of
non-face skin area to target region; and (4) determines the
misbehaving probability based on the skin proportion.
5.1 Target Map
Given two consecutive screenshots of a user, we define the
target map to identify changes (motion). This is achieved
through image subtraction, i.e., subtracting the pixel values
at corresponding positions of the two images. For example,
if a normal user moves his/her hand against the background
wall, both the hand and the wall are included in the target
region by image subtraction, and the target region contains
both skin (i.e. hand) and non-skin (i.e. wall). If a flasher
touches his/her naked part with hand, the target region con-
tains mostly skin (i.e. hand and naked parts). Therefore,
via image subtraction, target map captures the region we
are interested in for better detection accuracy.
To avoid the noise introduced by individual pixels, we
calculate the difference between tiles, and each tile is a rect-
angle containing multiple pixels. Specifically, each image is
divided into N × N tiles (N is an integer). For each tile
Trc (r, c ∈ [1, N ]), let xi(i ∈ [1, n]) be one of the n pixels
in that tile, we calculate the tile’s average intensity of RGB
channels as follows:
T rc = Σ
n
i=1(Rxi +Gxi +Bxi)/(n× 3), (1)
where Rxi , Gxi , Bxi are the R, G, B color channel intensities
of pixel xi, respectively. Therefore, the target map of any
two given images containsN×N elements, each representing
the difference between two corresponding tiles’ average RGB
intensities. An element is set to 1 if the absolute difference
is above the threshold, and 0 otherwise. The threshold (set
to 9 in our experiemts) is determined based on the average
difference of manually picked static images (i.e., no move-
ment). Target maps are further improved by filling holes
Image A Image B Target Map T A+ T B + T
Normal User
(SP : 0.143)
Misbehaving
User
(SP : 0.941)
Figure 4: Example of normal and misbehaving users. For each user, A and B are two screenshot images of the user; T
is the target map; A+T and B+T are original images overlaid with target region (white), non-face skin (red), and the
detected face (green). Skin proportion (SP ) are 0.143 and 0.941 respectively, thus a good indicator for differentiating
normal and misbehaving users.
and removing glitches via morphological filter (e.g., erosion
and dilation operation) [13]. See examples in Figure 4.
For each user, we can obtain multiple screenshots, re-
sulting in multiple target maps. To select the best target
map, we consider the size of the target region. Most video
chat users keep a relatively stable pose and move only part
of their body, such as head, hand or lower body. Thus a
good target map should contain a target region that is large
enough to be a body part while most part of the map is sta-
ble or static. Let TAmin be the area of the smallest possible
body part, which is derived from the training data and is set
to 10% of image size in our experiments. We select the best
target map for each user as follows: (a) if there are target
maps with target region bigger than TAmin, select the one
with the smallest target region; (b) if all target maps’ target
regions are smaller than TAmin, select the target map with
the largest target region.
5.2 Skin Detector
Next, we detect exposed skin in the target region. Unlike
typical pornographic or commercial images, skin color in
online video chat images varies in a wide range due to diverse
illumination conditions. Skin color does not always appear
yellow or orange, and actually falls out of this range most
of the time. Under different lighting, angle, and reflection
from computer screen, skin color could appear pink, brown,
blue, or even green in video chat images.
To address this problem, we consider three different skin
color palettes. Palette 1 is directly derived from the adap-
tive real-time skin detector in OpenCV, which could identify
most yellow and orange skin. Palette 2 adds the “pinkish”
color to Palette 1 to cover most Caucasian skin colors under
white lighting. This is achieved by converting RGB images
to the HSV color space and detecting pixels with a Hue value
in the range of [0, 60] and [300, 360]. Palette 3 focuses on the
skin color of flashers, which usually has darker illumination.
This is derived from a training dataset that contains only
flashers with manually marked skin area.
Figure 5 shows the skin proportion (SP ) (Section 5.3) of
normal and misbehaving users under these three skin color
palettes. An ideal skin palette should result in low SP val-
ues for normal users and high SP values for misbehaving
users. As shown in the figure, Palette 1 performs well for
normal users (shown in green); Palette 3 performs well for
misbehaving users (shown in red); and Palette 2’s perfor-
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Figure 5: Skin proportion of normal (green) and mis-
behaving (red) users under three different skin color
palettes. Palette 1 performs well for normal users;
Palette 3 performs well for misbehaving users; and
Palette 2’s performance is in the middle.
mance is in the middle. Since no single palette is perfect,
we propose an approach combining the three palettes, which
will be discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3 Skin Proportion
To distinguish normal users from misbehaving users, we
define the Skin Proportion (SP ) as follows:
SP = area of non-face skin/area of target region. (2)
Face skin area is determined using the frontal face detector
in OpenCV. If no face is detected, all the detected skin is
no-face skin. If there is a face, then non-face skin refers
to all the skin below jaw of detected face. For each user,
we select the best target map (Section 5.1), and compute
two SP values, one for each original image. Since a larger
SP value represents higher probability of being a flasher, to
ensure that we identify all possible flashers, we choose the
larger SP value as the final SP value for each user.
5.4 Misbehaving Probability
Let SP (x) be the skin proportion value of a given user x,
we need to determine the probability p(x) of user x being a
misbehaving user. Since a user is either misbehaving or not,
the distribution is binomial. A standard linear regression
model which assumes normal distribution of the dependent
variable is not appropriate. Instead, we use the binary lo-
gistic regression model, and the probability of success in the
outcome (i.e., being a flasher) can be expressed as follows:
log
p(x)
1− p(x) = α+ β · SP (x). (3)
As discussed in Section 5.2, we leverage three different mea-
sures (skin color palettes) to capture a user’s skin exposure
percentage (i.e., skin proportion). Therefore, the theoretical
model above can be further expressed as
log
p(x)
1− p(x) = α+β1 ·SP1(x)+β2 ·SP2(x)+β3 ·SP3(x), (4)
where SP1(x), SP2(x) and SP3(x) represent the skin pro-
portion of user x in the three different measures. Note that
the three skin color palettes may be highly correlated and
pose multicollinearity threats to our binary logistic regres-
sion model. To address this issue, we utilize Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) to transfer multiple correlated vari-
ables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. Based
on our experimental results (Section 7), we extract one com-
ponent, called the skin exposure component (SKC), to rep-
resent the three aforementioned measures of skin exposure:
log
p(x)
1− p(x) = α+ β · SKC(x). (5)
SKC(x) is a linear function of normalized SP scores ZSPi :
SKC(x) = a · ZSP1(x) + b · ZSP2(x) + c · ZSP3(x) (6)
where ZSPi(x) = (SPi(x) − avg(SPi(X)))/stdev(SPi(X)).
Here, avg(SPi(X)) and stdev(SPi(X)) are the average and
standard deviation of the skin proportions of all users in a
training dataset using the i-th skin color palette.
6. EVIDENCE FUSION
In addition to motion-based skin detection, we further
boost system performance by considering different facial and
upper body feature classifiers and combine all these classi-
fiers using the Dempster-Shafer Theory of evidence. Accord-
ing to our observations described in Section 3, most misbe-
having users do not show their faces. With further investiga-
tion, we find the presence of particular image characteristics
like the face, eyes, nose, mouth, and upper body are all
highly correlated with non-offensive content. Since individ-
ual classifiers look for different facial features of a face, their
results could be seen as independent evidences of the face
appearance. With our proposed classifier (i.e. motion-based
skin detector) and all facial (i.e face, eye, nose, mouth) and
upper body classifiers , we model these characteristics as a
set of evidences that are used for obscene content detection.
Each classifier is responsible for refining an individual evi-
dence. In the following section, we will show how we harness
these evidences to predict the likelihood of obscene content
based on a few sequential screenshot images of a chatter.
6.1 Modeling in Dempster-Shafer Theory
Dempster-Shafer theory provides a representation of hy-
potheses through the definition of Belief function (Bel). The
belief function is derived from a mass function, also called
basic probability assignment (m). Assume that Θ represents
all possible hypotheses and the basic probability assignment
(m) is defined for every element A of 2Θ (A is also called
the focal element), where 2Θ is the set of all subsets of Θ.
The value of the mass function m(A) ∈ [0, 1] and
m(∅) = 0P
A∈2Θ m(A) = 1
(7)
where ∅ is the empty set. To illustrate this, we consider the
example of misbehaving user detection. Assume a classifier
is used for refining the evidence and the hypothesis space
contains two hypotheses - a user is a flasher chatter (HF )
and a user is a normal chatter (HN ). We know that 2
Θ =
{∅, {HF }, {HN}, {HF , HN}} and m({HF }) + m({HN}) +
m(∅) +m({HF , HN}) = 1.
The belief function of hypothesis A, derived from basic
probability assignment m, is defined as a mapping from 2Θ
to the values in the interval [0, 1]
Bel(A) =
X
B⊆A
m(B) (8)
In the Dempster-Shafer theory, the belief value of hypoth-
esis A is typically interpreted as the confidence level of the
hypothesis. To illustrate how the belief function works,
we continue with the misbehaving user detection example
above. Suppose the evidence that the classifier refines can
support hypothesis HF with 0.7 reliability and cannot sup-
port hypothesis HN , i.e., the mass functions for set {HF }
and {HN} are m({HF }) = 0.7 and m({HN}) = 0. Fur-
ther, we can calculate the mass function for set {HF , HN},
i.e., m({HF , HN}) = 0.3 using Equation 7. To obtain the
confidence level of hypothesis HF , we use Equation 8, i.e.,
Bel(HF ) = 0.7.
The definition of mass functions is dependent upon spe-
cific applications and is not provided by the Dempster-Shafer
Theory. For image processing applications, the most widely
used mass functions are derived either from probability at
the pixel level [30] or from the distance to class centers [4].
In fault diagnosis applications, mass functions are defined
based on subjective quantification [33]. Certainly, these
quantifications are imprecise. In our application, we define
mass functions as the performance of classifiers when the
outcome of the classifiers are binary values; otherwise, mass
functions are defined as detection probability. Recall that
we harness some facial classifiers and an upper-body classi-
fier to refine evidences from user’s screenshot images, and
the outcome of each classifier is a binary value. Since differ-
ent binary classifiers have different classification precision,
the reliability of a piece of evidence is significantly depen-
dent upon the classification precision of the corresponding
classifier. For example, binary classifier Ci refines evidence
ei and evidence ei supports hypothesis Hj . If evidence ei is
100% reliable and is present, hypothesis Hj is true. How-
ever, binary classifier Ci may make mistakes when refining
evidence ei, i.e., the precision is not equal to 1.0 when a bi-
nary classifier determines whether the evidence is present or
not. Consequently, we use the precision of a binary classi-
fier to define the corresponding mass functions. Our system
also uses the motion-based skin detector and its outcomes
are the probability that a user is a flasher as well as the
probability that a user is a normal chatter. Therefore, we
use these probabilities to define mass functions instead of
using the classification precision.
In this application, obscene content detection is a binary
classification; therefore, our hypothesis space only contains
two hypotheses - a user is a normal chatter, and a user is
a misbehaving chatter. Here we formulate these two hy-
potheses as HN and HF respectively. Furthermore, different
Table 1: An example of evidence fusion.
ms(HN ) = 0.87 ms(HF ) = 0.13
mf=1(HN ) = 0.95 {HN} → 0.8265 ∅ → 0.1235
mf=1(HN , HF ) = 0.05 {HN} → 0.0435 {HF } → 0.0065
evidences are used to support different hypotheses. Facial
evidences (including the presence/absence of face, eyes, nose
and mouth) and the upper-body evidence are only used for
supporting hypothesis - HN , and these evidences provide
no supports for the opposite hypothesis - HF . On the other
hand, the skin exposure evidence can be used for supporting
both hypothesis HN and hypothesis HF . The main differ-
ence for these two types of evidences is that the beliefs of
hypotheses that derive from the former evidences are non-
additive and the beliefs of evidences that derive from the
latter are additive because the motion-based skin detector
is built upon probability theory while the other detectors
are based on evidence theory [17].
The following illustration gives an easy-to-understand in-
troduction to the calculation of mass functions based on
two different kinds of evidence - face evidence and skin evi-
dence - which support two different hypotheses. Assume the
face classifier’s precision for correctly detecting the face ev-
idence is 0.95 (i.e., when the face classifier identifies a face
in a screenshot image, there is actually a face present in
the image), and its precision for falsely detecting the face
evidence is 0.32 (i.e., when the face classifier does not iden-
tify a face in a screenshot image, there is actually a face
present in the image). Based on the definition of mass
functions, we can calculate the mass functions based on
face evidence as follows. (a) when the face classifier de-
tects a face: mf=1({HN}) = 0.95, mf=1({HF }) = 0, and
mf=1({HN , HF }) = 0.05; (b) when the classifier does not
detect a face: mf=0({HN}) = 0.32, mf=0({HF }) = 0, and
mf=0({HN , HF }) = 0.68.
Different from the mass function based on face evidence,
the mass functions based on skin evidence are defined as
follows. Assume the motion-based skin detector identifies
a user as a normal chatter with 0.87 probability and as a
misbehaving chatter with 0.13 probability. Then the mass
functions based on skin exposure evidence are ms({HN}) =
0.87, ms({HF }) = 0.13 and ms({HN , HF }) = 0.
Based on the mass functions above, we further calculate
the belief functions for hypothesis HN and HF , and get the
following results. When a face is detected by the face de-
tector, the belief that a user is a normal chatter is 0.95
and the belief that a user is a misbehaving chatter is 0,
i.e., Bel(HN ) = 0.95 and Bel(HF ) = 0. Conversely, the
belief that a user is a normal chatter is 0.32 and the be-
lief that a user is a misbehaving user is 0 when the face
detector does not detect a face, i.e., Bel(HN ) = 0.32 and
Bel(HF ) = 0. Apparently, these belief functions are non-
additive (i.e., Bel(HN )+Bel(HF ) < 1). On the other hand,
when the skin detector indicates a user is a normal chatter
with 0.87 probability and the user is a misbehaving chat-
ter with 0.13 probability, the belief that a user is a normal
chatter and the belief that a user is a misbehaving chat-
ter are 0.87 and 0.13 respectively, i.e., Bel(HN ) = 0.87 and
Bel(HF ) = 0.13. Notice that the belief functions are addi-
tive in this case.
6.2 Fusion and Decision Making
In this application, two hypotheses are supported by mul-
tiple evidences. Therefore, multiple evidences need to be
combined in an effective way. The example in Section 6.1
Figure 6: Sequential screenshot images of a user.
indicates that hypothesis HN is supported by face evidence
and skin exposure evidence. In order to obtain the belief of
hypothesis HN from multiple evidences, we utilize a rule of
combination that Shafer suggested [36], which allows mass
functions to be combined in the following way:
mi�j(H) =
P
A
T
B=H �=∅mi(A) ·mj(B)
1−PATB=∅mi(A) ·mj(B) (9)
where A,B,H ∈ 2Θ and A �= B �= H, mi and mj denote the
mass functions based on evidence i and evidence j respec-
tively. i � j and mi�j represent the new combined evidence
and the corresponding mass function based on the new ev-
idence, respectively. To illustrate this, we continue the ex-
ample introduced in Section 6.1 and assume that the face
classifier identifies that a face is presented in a screenshot
image. The combination results are summarized in Table 1.
For each cell, we take the corresponding focal elements, in-
tersect them and multiply their corresponding basic proba-
bility assignment. In the combined evidence, there are two
focal elements - {HN} and {HF }. The combined mass func-
tions are calculated as follows:
m(f=1)�s({HN}) = 0.8265 + 0.0435
1− 0.1235 = 0.9926
m(f=1)�s({HF }) = 0.0065
1− 0.1235 = 0.0074
Based on the new combined evidence (f = 1) � s, we
further calculate the belief of hypothesis HN and the be-
lief of hypothesis HF , which are Bel(HN ) = 0.9926 and
Bel(HF ) = 0.0074. Thus, the user is more likely to be a
normal chatter according to the combined evidence.
As introduced in Section 4, the system has the capacity of
taking multiple screenshots for any user with a 10-second in-
terval. This capacity allows our software to refine evidences
in a more reliable way. In the current implementation, our
software uses a sequence of three screenshot images from
a user to make a decision. One of the advantages is that
three sequential screenshot images of a user can reduce de-
cision errors. Figure 6 shows three sequential screenshot
images of a user. Our experiment indicates that the face
detector cannot refine facial evidence from the first screen-
shot image because of the smoke, and the mouth detector
cannot refine mouth evidence from the first two screenshot
images because of the hand with a cigarette. However, the
user’s facial evidences are present in the third screenshot
image. To address this issue, the decision making of our
software uses the rule of maximum belief. Assume the be-
lief values of hypothesis HN , derived from three screenshot
images, are Bel1(HN ), Bel2(HN ) and Bel3(HN ). The be-
lief value of hypothesis HN for the user then is Bel(HN ) =
max{Bel1(HN ), Bel2(HN ), Bel3(HN )}. Here, we use the
maximum belief of hypothesis HN because it can greatly re-
duce the false positive rate and keep the false negative rate
at a reasonable level.
7. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed solution for de-
tecting obscene content and misbehaving users in online
video chat services. We first describe the experimental setup
and present the results of individual binary classifiers. We
then focus on evaluating the performance of our motion-
based skin detector and DST-based fusion technique.
7.1 Experimental Setup
As described in Section 3, screenshot images from 20,000
Chatroulette users are used in our experiments. We first fil-
ter out images that are dark or contain static scenes. Due to
the limited space, details of this filtering process are omitted,
and we refer interested readers to [2]. The categorization of
the remaining 15,000 users are shown in Figure 1 (filtered
dataset). These images are then randomly split into two
subsets of equal size – one for training and the other one for
testing. Since the binary classifiers (i.e., facial detectors and
upper body detector) have already been well trained in the
OpenCV library, we only use the training dataset to refine
the reliabilities of these classifiers’ evidences (the mass func-
tions of these classifiers’ evidences). Both the motion-based
skin detector and DST-based fusion system are trained and
tested using the training and testing datasets, respectively.
7.2 Binary Classifiers
Our system utilizes a number of binary classifiers from
the OpenCV library to refine evidences. As described in
Section 6, these classifiers do not give accurate detection,
and a reliability value has to be assigned to each evidence
that the corresponding classifier refines. Recall that we de-
fine the reliability value as the precision of the corresponding
binary classifier. Intuition suggests that the performance of
our fusion system is greatly dependent upon the reliabil-
ity value assignment. Therefore, we randomly select 1,000
users’ screenshot images from the training dataset to re-
fine the reliability of each classifier, and place the selected
screenshot images back to the training dataset (i.e., random
selection with replacement). We repeat this operation K
times (K = 10) and use the mean value as the reliability
value for the corresponding evidence. As shown in Table 2,
the standard deviations of these evidences are fairly small,
thus the mass functions which are used for the combination
of facial and upper body evidences are relatively stable.
7.3 Motion-based Skin Detector
As described in Section 5, we consider three different skin
color palettes and calculate the corresponding skin propor-
tion SP measures using motion-based target maps. The SP
measures are then combined in our binary logistic regression
model to calculate the probability of a user being a flasher.
Correlation Analysis and PCA. Recall that we use PCA
to transfer the three correlated SP variables into one uncor-
related variable. Using the screenshot images in the training
dataset, we first apply the method (described in Section 5)
to calculate users’ skin proportion SP in three different mea-
Table 2: Mass Functions for Facial and Upper Body
Evidences
x mx=1(HN ) mx=0(HN ) stdevx=1 stdevx=0
face 0.984 0.327 0.017 0.018
eye 0.773 0.434 0.018 0.020
nose 0.802 0.455 0.029 0.030
mouth 0.711 0.219 0.016 0.020
upper body 0.821 0.491 0.030 0.025
Table 3: Correlations among 3 Predictors
SP1 SP2 SP3
SP1 1 0.900∗∗ 0.765∗∗
SP2 0.900∗∗ 1 0.855∗∗
SP3 0.765∗∗ 0.855∗∗ 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
sures and then performed a correlation analysis of the three
SP measures for each user. As shown in Table 3, the cor-
relations are significant, and PCA is indeed needed in order
to avoid multicollinearity threats to our regression model.
We used the PCA procedure in PASW18.0 (SPSS) [37] to
transform the three measures of skin exposure. Kaiser Cri-
terion (Eigenvalue > 1) was followed when selecting compo-
nents and a scree plot (Figure 8) was used to confirm the
dimensions identified. We extracted one component (skin
exposure component SKC) to represent the three SP mea-
sures according to the Eigenvalues and the elbow point iden-
tified in the scree plot. When subsequently building our bi-
nary logistic regression model, we only needed to consider
SKC, which is a linear function of the normalized SP scores:
SKC(x) = 0.362 ·ZSP1(x)+0.384 ·ZSP2(x)+0.349 ·ZSP3(x)
(10)
Model Construction. Since the training process of motion-
based skin detector can be performed offline, we used the
binary logistic regression procedure in the statistical pack-
age SYSTAT 13 [38]. Maximum Likelihood Estimation with
EM algorithm was utilized in estimating the proposed model
coefficients. The resulting regression model is as follows:
log
p(x)
1− p(x) = −0.775 + 1.114 · SKC(x) (11)
Consider the Hosmer Lemeshow test [18], which is a test
of goodness of fit for logistic regression model with contin-
uous predictors, and a statistically non-significant test re-
sult (χ2) indicates a good fit of the model. Our proposed
model provided a significantly good fit to the training data
(χ2 = 12.318, df = 8, p = 0.138)1 (p < 0.05). Specifically,
our skin exposure composite is a statistically significant pre-
dictor for the probability of a user being a flasher. This
was tested with Wald’s test [40], which is a statistical test
of significance for individual variable. The test statistics
(Wald = 43.108, df = 1, p = 0.000) indicated that the influ-
ence of SKC is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
Model Performance. Using the model constructed above,
1df and p denote degree of freedom and p-value, respectively.
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Figure 8: Scree plot: Eigenvalues of extracted prin-
cipal components.
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(b) Classification for misbehaving users
Figure 7: Performance comparison of obscene content detection. Our motion-based skin exposure detector (MSED)
outperforms PicBlock, and our DST fusion based solution (SafeVchat) has the best performance.
we then evaluated the model’s performance in terms cor-
rectly classifying normal and misbehaving users. Figure 7
shows the precision-recall curves of different methods. As
shown in Figure 7(a), when we only consider an individual
skin color measure (no PCA), the performance for classify-
ing normal users is slightly worse than that of the combi-
nation of three skin color measures using PCA. In contrast,
Figure 7(b) shows that the performance for classifying mis-
behaving users remains approximately the same no matter
whether PCA is used or not. To understand the reason be-
hind this, we review the example in Figure 5. When we con-
sider skin color in a small space, many misbehaving users
are mixed with normal users. As the skin color space in-
creases, a majority of misbehaving users are detected with
more skin exposures and meanwhile a smaller number of
normal users are also falsely detected. In Figure 5, there is
an interesting observation – the normal users become identi-
cal and misbehaving users are still mixed with normal users
when skin color space is enlarged. Therefore, a straight-
forward phenomenon shown in Figure 7 is that considering
three measures improves the classification performance for
normal users but not for misbehaving users.
7.4 Performance of SafeVchat
We now evaluate the performance of overall system, which
uses DST to fuse the evidences of facial, upper body, and
motion-based skin exposure detectors. The overall system
is evaluated using the testing dataset, and the precision-
recall curves for correctly classifying normal and misbehav-
ing users are plotted in Figure 7. We can see that SafeVchat
improves significantly in both precision and recall over other
techniques.
We first compare SafeVchat with a state-of-the-art com-
mercial software for detecting pornographic content – Porno-
graphic Image Blocker (PicBlock 4.2.3). To the best of our
knowledge, it uses both skin-color detection and text analy-
sis techniques to determine whether an image on a website is
objectionable. Its output is a binary value, i.e., either offen-
sive or normal content. We used the same testing dataset
to compare our system with PicBlock 4.2.3. As shown in
Figure 7, the classification performance of PicBlock is much
worse than our motion-based skin exposure detector and our
DST-based fusion system. There are several reasons behind
this. (1) There is no text information that can be used in
online video chat systems. Therefore, the function of text
analysis in PicBlock cannot help. (2) PicBlock does not con-
sider motion between images, and may falsely identify some
background as objectionable content. (3) Some misbehaving
users do not show their entire body trunk. Instead, only a
small proportion of skin region can be detected, which may
bypass PicBlock’s detection.
The fused system also outperforms our motion-based skin
exposure detector. The reasons are the following. To reduce
skin exposure detection errors, the skin exposure detector
uses the face detector provided in the OpenCV library to
crop the skin region on a face. However, the face detector
cannot be operated in a perfect condition (e.g. a partial or
side face cannot be detected). Therefore, some facial skin
regions that cannot be identified by the face detector may be
considered as large skin exposure, increasing the detection
error in this condition. Using DST-based fusion, when the
skin exposure detector mis-classifies a face-presented user,
facial and upper body evidences, to some extent, can correct
the classification errors and thus boost the performance of
overall system.
We also observe in Figure 7 that the precision for classify-
ing normal users remains high (almost 1.0) until the recall is
above 0.75. The reason is that when there are positive facial
or upper body evidences, the user is very likely to be a nor-
mal user (e.g., users who show their faces are very likely to
be normal). However, when no such positive evidences are
identified, more classification errors are possible (e.g., users
who do not show their faces can be either normal or misbe-
having), and the classification precision of the overall sys-
tem approaches that of the skin exposure detector. On the
other hand, the precision for classifying misbehaving users
remains fairly stable (approximately 0.7) when the recall is
in the range of [0.5, 1.0]. The reason is that when skin color
space increases, more misbehaving users will be identified,
meanwhile normal users who wear cloth with similar color
to the skin color space may be misclassified as flashers. As
we mentioned in Section 6, facial and upper body evidences
can, to some extent, reduce the number of these misclas-
sified users. Therefore, the classification precision remains
relatively stable when the recall increases from 0.5 to 1.0.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This paper describes a system for detecting obscene con-
tent and identifying misbehaving users in online video chat
services such as Chatroulette. A novel, motion-based skin
detection method has been introduced. The results of indi-
vidual binary classifiers such as face, eye, and nose detectors
as well as our probabilistic motion-based skin detector are
fused together into an overall decision classifying the user as
misbehaving or not, based on Dempster-Shafer Theory. By
using Chatroulette’s real-world dataset, we have conducted
a series of experiments, and evaluated our system perfor-
mance. Compared to the current state-of-the-art software,
PicBlock 4.2.3, our system achieves significantly higher clas-
sification precision and recall.
While our system has been specifically designed in the
context of Chatroulette online video chat services, it can
be extended to other webcam based online video chat sys-
tems. Our preliminary observations of several webcam based
online chat rooms (such as Chat for Free [8], Goth Chat
City [16] and iWebcam [1] etc.) show that the content trans-
mitted and user behaviors in these online chat rooms are
similar to Chatroulette. One difference is that the obscene
content and behaviors are more common in such online chat
rooms. We plan to experimentally explore how well our sys-
tem performs in the context of online video chat rooms.
At present, we use three sequential screenshot images of
a user to predict the likelihood that the user is a misbe-
having user. It took on average 878 milliseconds to pro-
cess three sequential screenshots of each user. While this
response time is reasonable for obscene content detection,
running our software and sequentially processing screenshot
images on a large scale may result in high response times. In
general, there are approximately 30,000 users online simul-
taneously. In the future, we will explore ways to scale our
software. A software demo video is available in our project
website [2].
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